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EXPANDING THE INTENT REQUIREMENT IN
NORTHERN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CASES
Racial segregation in northern public school systems' has increasingly
become the focus of litigation which has revealed a form of racial
discrimination far more complex and subtle yet equally as serious 2 as
that found in the South. 3 Thus when the Supreme Court of the United
States announced that the distinguishing factor between de jure and de
facto segregation 4 is intent to segregate,5 the standard to be used for
I. Substantial racial imbalance exists throughout non-southern public school sys-
tems. In 1971 roughly 57% of black pupils in the North and West attended schools with
over 80% minority enrollment while in the South only 32% of black pupils attended such
schools. The percentages of black pupils attending schools with more than 80% minority in
some of the northern cities are: Compton, Cal.-97.8%; Gary, Ind.-95.7%; Cleveland,
Ohio-91.3%; Newark, N.J.-91.3%; Los Angeles, Cal.-86.6%; Milwaukee, Wis.-
78.8%. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 218-19, nn.3 & 4 (1973). In New York
City in 1970, 65.7% of its black pupils attended schools with more than 80% minority
enrollment. Ribicoff, The Future of School Integration in the United States, 1 J.L. &
EDuc. 1, 14 (1972).
2. Similar conditions exist in both the North and South which have a detrimental
impact on a child's motivation and self-image: scarcity of educational materials, dilapi-
dated facilities and overcrowding. The myriad of causal factors underlying such condi-
tions include discriminatory housing practices, socio-economic status of blacks, indi-
vidual preferences and prejudices in residency choice, and assignment to schools by
neighborhoods. The result is the establishment of segregated situations that make it
possible for school authorities to use subtle methods, such as constructing new schools in
all black neighborhoods or gerrymandering school attendance, without establishing the
clear prejudicial connection to state action that provides the basis for judicial intervention
in the South. See generally U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN
SUBURBIA 1974; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, PUBLIC SCHOOLS, CITIES INTHE NORTH
AND WEST 1%2; Fiss, Racialimbalance in the Public Schools: Constitutional Concepts, 78
HARv. L. REV. 564, 567-74 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Fiss]; Goodman, De Facto School
Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 275, 400-35
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Goodman].
3. When the distinction is made between "northern" and "southern" cases or
jurisdictions, the basis for distinction is not necessarily geographical but the presence of
statutes that authorized or compelled racial separation at the time of Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. De jure and de facto segregation have been defined as follows: "[Dle jure should
refer to segregation created or maintained by official act, regardless of its form. De facto
segregation should be limited to segregation resulting from fortuitous residential pat-
terns." Taylor v. Board of Educ., 191 F. Supp. 181, 194 n. 12 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d
36 (2d Cir. 1%1). See Moses v. Washington Parish School Bd., 276 F. Supp. 834,840 (D.C.
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establishing intent became vitally important to future public school
desegregation efforts in the North. The determination of such a stand-
ard was the primary question in Hart v. Community School Board of
Education.6
In Hart plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief from
alleged racial discrimination practiced by the local and city boards of
education at a junior high school.7 The district court found that defend-
ants could have reasonably foreseen that their policies would have a
segregative effect 8 and further that defendants failed to mitigate that
effect. 9 The court concluded that defendants were responsible for these
conditions even though it found that their actions were not racially
motivated.' 0 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the
La. 1967); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401,493 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'dsub nom. Smuck
v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Fiss, supra note 3, at 584.
5. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973).
6. 383 F. Supp. 699, enforced, 383 F. Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 512 F.2d 37
(2d Cir. 1975).
7. 383 F. Supp. at 706. Defendants impleaded city, state and federal housing
authorities as the parties allegedly responsible for any segregated conditions that existed
at the junior high school. The court mooted the third party complaint but retained
jurisdiction over the third party defendants for remedial purposes. The Second Circuit
subsequently dismissed this complaint because it involved too many parties and issues.
512 F.2d at 41. Other courts have held similar complaints justiciable. See, e.g., Ybarra v.
City of San Jose, 503 F.2d 1041 (9th Cir. 1974); Armour v. Nix, Civil No. 16708 (N.D. Ga.
1975); Mapp v. Board of Educ., 341 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Tenn.), aff'd, 477 F.2d 851 (6th Cir.
1973). A considerable amount of evidence exists which would provide a basis for finding
the government liable for the segregated housing conditions that are largely responsible
for the segregated school patterns. See Gautreaux v. Hills, 96 S. Ct. 1538 (1976);
Rubinowitz & Dennis, School Desegregation versus Public Housing Desegregation: The
Local District and the Metropolitan Housing District, 10 URBAN L. ANN. 145 (1975). See
also S. REP. No. 92-000, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 121-22 (1972) ("it is clear that federal, state
and local government practices at every level have contributed to housing segregation
which exists today"); Carter, De Facto School Segregation: An Examination of the Legal
and Constitutional Questions Presented, 16 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 502, 514 (1965); Fiss,
supra note 2, at 586. For a thorough exploration of this point as a possible basis for holding
the State liable for segregated schools on a metropolitan basis see Kushner & Werner,
Metropolitan Desegregation After Milliken v. Bradley: The Case for Land Use Litigation
Strategies, 24 CATH. U.L. REV. 187 (1975).
8. 383 F. Supp. at 711-13, 721. Seventeen per cent of the student population of the
school district was non-white; 41% of these students went to the particular junior high
school which was 82% non-white and using only 41% of its facilities.
9. "Feeder" school and construction regulations promulgated by defendants has-
tened the racial imbalance. Yet despite constant warnings of community leaders and some
school board members regarding the segregated conditions created by the school board
regulations, defendants refused to implement any effective regulations to reduce the
segregation. Id. at 715-21.
10. Id. at 721.
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district court decision and held that there was a basis for the finding of
de jure segregation."
The constitutional basis for the Hart decision and for a substantial
portion12 of all desegregation litigation is the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment.' 3 To establish a violation in school segrega-
tion cases, plaintiff traditionally is required to prove the existence of a
"segregated" condition, 4 "state action" which has caused or main-
tained the "segregated" condition, 5 and that such "state action" was
intentional. 16 Racial imbalance alone is insufficient to establish the
existence of a "segregated" condition within a school or school sys-
tem. 7 The attitudes of the community and the school administration
must also be taken into consideration. 8 Racial imbalance is, however, a
signal for courts to closely scrutinize the facts of the case. 19
I1. 512 F.2d at 50. The district court did not base its opinion on de jure segregation. 383
F. Supp. at 732.
12. Desegregation decisions are also based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I, forbids states from "deny[ing] any person...
equal protection of the law."
14. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 196 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 24 (1971); notes 18-19 infra.
15. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1,
16-17 (1958); notes 20-22 infra.
16. When the state's actions expressly advocate the creation of dual school systems,
proof of this requirement becomes unnecessary. But when the state's actions are facially
neutral, the need to prove an underlying segregative design becomes important. This
requirement is a well-established prerequisite for proving an equal protection violation.
See, e.g., Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944). See also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,
413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973).
For support of this three-part analysis of the equal protection clause see Oliver v.
Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178, 182 (6th Cir. 1974); Husbands v. Common-
wealth, 395 F. Supp. 1107, 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1975); 9 HARV. CIv. RIGHTS-CIV. LB. L. REV.
124. 149 (1974). Note that when the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954), indicated that "separate educational facilities [for different races] are inher-
ently unequal," state maintenance of such facilities became a clear violation of the equal
protection clause. Id. at 495.
17. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 196 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 24 (1971); Fiss, supra note 2, at 608.
18. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
19. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 18 (1971), the Court
declared that "where it is possible to identify a 'white school' or a 'Negro school' simply
by reference to the racial composition of teachers and staff, the quality of school buildings
and equipment, or the organization of sports activities, a prima facie case of violation of
the Equal Protection Clause is shown." One possible explanation for the Court's
singling out of these particular factors is that they are almost entirely under the control of
the school authorities. The Court went on to point out that "in a system with a history of
segregation the need for remedial criteria of sufficient specificity to assure a school
authority's compliance with its constitutional duty warrants a presumption against schools
1976]
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Once a "segregated" condition has been shown to exist, it is then
necessary to establish a causal connection between that condition and
action by the state. 20 The exact nature and degree of this causal
connection in the area of school segregation cases has not been well-
defined. 21 The majority of cases have found a sufficient nexus between
the state and a local school board to enable the court to equate board
actions with state action, thus establishing the necessary causal
connection. 22
When the local board's actions are facially neutral yet create a
discriminatory result, the final requirement of proof of an intent to
create or maintain the segregated conditions becomes critical. 23 Two
policy considerations have traditionally justified the imposition of the
intent requirement: first, the inherent limitations on a court's ability to
that are substantially disproportionate in their composition." Id. at 26. See also Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741 n.19 (1974).
20. The Supreme Court has established an exception when there has been a finding of
intentionally segregative school board action in a significant portion of a school system. In
such a case there is a presumption that other segregated schools are not adventitious, and
the burden shifts to the school authorities to prove otherwise. See Keyes v. School Dist.
No. 1,413 U.S. 189,208 (1973). The Supreme Court has found a causal connection where
the state involvement has been very remote in past non-educational racial discrimination
cases. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299-301 (1966) (private individuals are
agents of the state when they exercise public functions, therefore operating a private
segregated municipal park is state action); Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130, 135-37 (1964)
(state enforcement of segregated policy in private amusement park through eviction and
arrest is state action); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961)
(restaurant located in public garage; state is responsible for the owner's discriminatory
actions). But seeJackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (public utility's
decision to cut off power not subject to due process requirements because it was not state
action); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (racially discriminatory state
liquor board regulations did not sufficiently implicate the state in racial discrimination
practiced by a private club to make those practices state action).
21. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974), suggests that a causal relationship
must be substantial, but does not indicate how substantiality is to be determined. But see
Comment, Public School Segregation and the Contours of Unconstitutionality: The
DenverSchoolBoard Case, 45 U. CoLo. L. REv. 457,467-68 (1974) (it is suggested that as a
result of Swann the position of the Supreme Court is very broad with regard to this issue).
The lower courts are widely divided on this question. See Note, De Facto School
Segregation and the "State Action " Requirement: A Suggested New Approach, 48 IND.
L.J. 304, 314 & n.50 (1973); Note, Segregation in the Metropolitan Context: The "White
Noose" Tightens, 58 IowA L. REv. 322 (1972).
22. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1958).
23. See note 16 supra. This requirement has been emphasized in opinions dealing with
various types of state action. See, e.g., Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 56-7 (1964)
(discriminatory legislative action); United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir.
1974) (selective criminal enforcement); Powell v. Workmen's Compensation Bd., 327
F.2d 131, 137 (2d Cir. 1964); Burt v. City of New York, 156 F.2d 791, 792 (2d Cir. 1946)
(city building department).
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explore all factors that may provide the basis for the state's action 24 and
second, the realization that most legislative classifications invariably
have some discriminatory effect. 25 To satisfy the intent requirement, no
reasonable basis may exist to support the racial classifications drawn by
the state. 26 When it is not evident from the state's acts per se that the
racial classifications are unreasonable, 27 plaintiffs must then prove an
intent to create segregated conditions in order to negate all other
reasonable explanations for the state's discriminating actions.
28
Absent definitive articulation from the Supreme Court of the intent
necessary to find educational segregation,29 the lower courts have split
over the intent requirement.30 Some courts contended that state action
must be shown to be actually motivated by the desire to create or
24. See Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940) ("[s]ince the members of a
legislature necessarily enjoy a familiarity with local conditions which this Court cannot
have, the presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the most explicit
demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination .... ").
25. See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). See also
Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 358 n.35
(1949) (the duty of legislatures is to discriminate by recognizing relevant distinctions and
formulating reasonable classifications); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1098 (1969) (suggesting that the requirement of a showing of
discriminatory intent as a "necessary basis for challenging administrative action on equal
protection grounds . ..may represent a recognition that the practical difficulties in
administration may make selective application of a statute necessary or inevitable"); 61
COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1115-22 (1961).
26. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961): "State legislatures are
presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice,
their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any
state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." See also Kotch v. Board of River
Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
27. In Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 298 (1955) (Brown 11), the Supreme
Court indicated "that racial discrimination in public schools is unconstitutional"
(emphasis added) thus suggesting that any classification by race would be considered
intrinsically unreasonable.
28. Under the new equal protection doctrine when a fundamental right or suspect
category is involved, initial proof by the plaintiff of intent would be unnecessary since the
burden of justification is cast on the state rather than the challenging party. See, e.g.,
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
Since the Supreme Court indicated in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rod-
riguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973), that it did not consider education to be a fundamental right
and since no suspect classification is expressly involved, it is arguable that the new equal
protection doctrines will not be applicable.
29. See, e.g., Davis v. School Dist., 309F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Mich. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d
573 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 913 (1971); Downs v. Board of Educ., 336 F.2d 988
(10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965).
30, Some courts have held that state authorities have an affirmative duty to alleviate
racial imbalance, regardless of the cause. See, e.g., Brewer v. School Board, 397 F.2d 37
(4th Cir. 1968); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'dsub nom. Smuck
1976]
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maintain the segregated conditions (the motive view);31 other courts
contended it was only necessary to prove that the effect of state action
was the creation or maintenance of segregated conditions (the effect
view).2 The source of these conflicting positions may be traced to
different interpretations of the nature of the violation proscribed in
Brown v. Board of Education.33 Courts favoring the motive view found
the source of the constitutional violation in the state authorities' use of
racial criteria in making school decisions.3 4 Courts adopting the effect
v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Barksdale v. Springfield School Comm., 237 F.
Supp. 543, 546 (D. Mass.), vacated on other grounds, 348 F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965). A few
courts created a rebuttable presumption of intent to segregate when severe racial imba-
lance exists. See, e.g., United States v. Board of Comm'rs, 368 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D. Ind.
1973), rev'd in part, 503 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1974); Davis v. School Dist., 309 F. Supp. 734
(E.D. Mich. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 913 (1971); United
States v. School Dist. 151,286 F. Supp. 786 (N.D. Ill.), affl'd, 404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968).
Other courts followed the foreseeable effect approach used in Hart. See, e.g., United
States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d 380, 390 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. School
Dist. of Omaha, 521 F.2d 530 (8th Cir. 1975); Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508
F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1974); Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 359 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Penn. 1973);
Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 592 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir.
1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
31. See, e.g., Husbands v. Pennsylvania, 395 F. Supp. 1107, 1133 (E.D. Penn. 1975);
Morales v. Shannon, 366 F. Supp. 813, 829 (W.D. Tex. 1973); Henry v. Godsell, 165 F.
Supp. 87, 91 (E.D. Mich. 1958); cf. Soria v. Oxnard, 488 F.2d 579,585 (9th Cir. 1973). The
Supreme Court has on various occasions warned against judicial review of legislative or
administrative motivation. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971)
(inherent difficulties of ascertaining a collective will); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 383-84 (1968) (impropriety of striking down an otherwise constitutional statute on the
basis of an illicit legislative motive).
32. See Berry v. School Dist. of City of Benton Harbor, 505 F.2d 238 (6th Cir. 1974);
Pride v. Community School Bd., 482 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1973); Cisneros v. Corpus Christi
Independent School Dist., 467 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1972). Using an "effect test" essentially
eliminates the intent requirement with regard to school desegregation cases.
33. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown ]). Several commentators have pointed out that Brown
I never clearly indicated whether it was the result of segregated education or the cause of
the segregated education (the official mandate) which was deemed violative of the equal
protection clause. See Fiss, supra note 2, at 602-03; Goodman, supra note 2, at 276-77;
Note, De Facto School Segregation and the State Action Requirement, supra note 21, at
306; 40 CONN. B.J. 493, 501 (1966); 69 Nw. L. REV. 799,803 n.30 (1974); 9 VILL. L. REv.
283, 285 (1964).
34. Support for this view has been found in Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294,298
(1955) (Brown 1) in which Chief Justice Warren explained that Brown Iheld "that racial
discrimination in public education is unconstitutional" (emphasis added). Literal applica-
tion of this view would require public officials to be "color blind" when discharging their
duties. SeeTometz v. Board of Educ., 39111.2d 593,607-09,237 N.E.2d 498,505-07 (1968)
(House, J., dissenting). But see Fiss, supra note 2, at 602-03 (arguing that racially imbal-
anced schools confront the courts with a different social problem than that presented in
Brown land use of an interpretation based on Brown /only obscures the special aspects of
the problem); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 25, at 1089 (con-
tending that Brown I "does not appear to be based on color blind principle because the
[Vol. 12:245
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view found the source of the constitutional violation in the harmful
effects of the segregated conditions.35
Although neither the motive nor the effect view has been expressly
approved by the Supreme Court, previous decisions appear to support
the validity of both. In Green v. County School Board,36 the Supreme
Court held that school authorities had an affirmative duty to convert
segregated districts to a "unitary system." 37 The imposition of an
affirmative duty clearly indicates that the elimination of racial motiva-
tion is not the ultimate goal in school desegregation cases. 38 This concept
was reinforced by Wright v. Council of City of Emporia39 which stressed
Court fully discussed the importance of equal educational opportunities and explicitly
stressed sociological and psychological evidence of the actual inequality of segregated
education").
35. Support for this view has been found in the extensive evidence presented in Brown
I on the detrimental effect of the segregated conditions and in the Court's statement:
"Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 495 (1954). See Fiss, supra note 2, at 590-91, 594-95. Arguably the effect view
originated in McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950), which is based on
the inequality of segregated educational opportunity rather than the impermissibility of
state supported segregation. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note
25, at 1185. But see Bickel, The Decade of School Desegregation: Progress and Prospects,
64 Cot uM. L. REV. 193,218 (1964) (arguing that the Court is not qualified to settle the issue
based upon this rationale).
36. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
37. Id. at 437-38. The origins of the affirmative duty concept are found in U.S. v.
Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 847 (5th Cir. 1966) in which the court
contended that Brown I and Ii required segregated school systems to "take affirmative
action to reorganize their schools into a unitary nonracial system." Prior to Greenseveral
federal courts had distinguished integration and desegregation. The distinction first arose
in Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955) and appears to have been
incorporated in Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which defined desegregation as:
"'the assignment of students to public schools and within such schools without regard to
their race, color, religion, or national origin, but 'desegregation' shall not mean the
assignment of students to public schools in order to overcome racial imbalance." 42
U.S.C. § 2000c (1970). It is clear that the Green decision, at least implicitly seriously
undermined the distinction and Jefferson Countyexpressly abolished it, 372 F.2d at 846-47
& n. 5 . The concept of affirmative duty has also been expressly applied by the Supreme
Court in an urban setting. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I,
16 (1971).
38. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189,224 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part) (arguing that in view of the "affirmative duty" command, the
promotion of the de facto/de jure distinction is unprincipled); Note, Segregation in the
Metropolitan Context: The "White Noose" Tightens, supra note 21, at 331 ("It would
seem illogical, under the Green rationale, to invalidate a 'freedom-of-choice' plan not
because it is discriminatory (it is facially neutral), but because it does not achieve the
necessary degree of integration, and then fail to invalidate a facially neutral northern
system which also produces only minimal integration."). See alsoGoodman, supra note 2,
at 296.
39. 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
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the importance of the effect rather than the motive of school authorities'
desegregation efforts. These two cases provide persuasive authority
that the effect of the state's action is the ultimate determinant of an
equal protection violation. 40
In Keyes v. School District No. 1,41 however, the Court seemed to
approve the motive approach. In Keyes neither the state nor the city had
enacted racially discriminatory educational statutes. 42 The lower court
nevertheless found that the facts indicated racial discrimination in one
part of the school district.43 In reviewing the holding of the court of
appeals that racial discrimination in one part of a school district does
not indicate a segregative intent in the rest of the district, the Supreme
Court established a series of evidentiary guidelines operative when
intentionally segregative actions in a meaningful portion of a school
system are found.' Although the question of intent was not at issue,45
the majority emphasized that intent to segregate was the differentiating
40. Id. at 462.
41. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
42. Id. at 191. Keyes is the first school desegregation case in which the Supreme Court
expressly recognized the intent requirement. It is also the first Supreme Court opinion to
phrase the violation in terms of de jure segregation. It is clear that the Court has drawn a
line with regard to the effect view: first, by limiting it in saying that effect alone will not be
sufficient in all cases, and secondly by expressly creating the category of de facto
segregation for those situations in which intent is absent and segregatory effect is present.
Since Keyes was also the first northern school desegregation case before the Court,
arguably the line has been drawn between northern and southern cases. The idea that there
may be two standards, one for the South and another for the North, has been suggested
several times. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 232 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part); Karst, Not One Law at Rome and Another at
Athen$: The Fourteenth Amendment in NationwideApplication, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 383.
43. 413 U.S. at 193-95. It was clear that the schools involved weresegregated. Petition-
ers originally sought relief regarding'some of the most severely segregated schools in the
Park Hill area. The action was expanded to include the entire "core city" area. The district
court granted relief, relying on Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), since the "core
city" schools were educationally inferior. 313 F. Supp. 61, 82, 83 (D. Colo. 1970). The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Park Hill ruling but reversed the
decision regarding the "core city" area, finding that the showing of deliberate segregation
with regard to Park Hill proved no overall policy of segregation. 445 F.2d 990, 1006-07
(10th Cir. 1971).
44. 413 U.S. at 203, 208, 211. Briefly these guidelines are: (1) Proof of state imposed
segregation in a substantial portion of a district will indicate a dual school system unless
geographical or natural boundaries exist which have the effect of dividing the district into
separate units; (2) When the above exception is operative, there still exists a presumption
that any segregated school is not adventitious; (3) School boards must either rebut the
presumption or show that its acts did not create or contribute to the segregated condition.
45. The court noted that "petitioners apparently concede for the purposes of this case
that . . . [they] must prove . . . intentional state action." Id. at 198.
[Vol. 12:245
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factor between de jure and de facto segregation. 46 The Court did not,
however, indicate by what standard intent was to be determined,47 and
simply alluded to evidence concerning the extent of segregation, 48 the
feeding and zoning patterns, 4 9 and the site selection and construction of
new schools" as being of great weight in finding de jure segregation.
The proper standard for discerning segregative intent was the primary
issue in Hart.5' Plaintiffs filed suit less than one month after the Keyes
decision. The district court found defendants responsible for the segre-
gated conditions even though it expressly found that their actions were
not racially motivated. 52 On appeal defendants urged that "upon the
basis of Keyes . . . [a] finding that it [was] guilty of having caused
segregation without a finding that its activity was racially motivated is
reversible error."' 53 In rejecting defendants' contention, the Second
Circuit insisted that the Supreme Court in Keyes had been concerned
solely with what effect the accepted finding of de jure segregation in one
part of a school district should have on the status of the remainder of the
district. 54 The court concluded that the Supreme Court had no reason to
decide "whether intentional action leading foreseeably to discrimination
but taken without racial motivation, might not also constitute de jure
discrimination." 55 The court also concluded that the majority in Keyes
46. Id. at 208.
47. Id. at 233 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
48. Id. at 201-02.
49. Id. These elements are commonly recognized as indications of segregation. See
Marshall, The Standard of Intent: Two Recent Michigan Cases, 4 J.L. & EDUC. 227,230
(1975).
50. 413 U.S. at 201-02; see Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,
21 (1971) ("In ascertaining the existence of legally imposed school segregation, the
existence of a pattern of school construction and abandonment is thus a factor of great
weight."). See also United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 474 F.2d 81, 87-89 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973).
Another factor considered important by the courts is the presence of reasonable
alternatives. See, e.g., Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451,461(1972);
Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430,439 (1968); Soria v. Oxnard School Dist. Bd. of
Trustees, 488 F.2d 579, 588 (9th Cir. 1973).
51. 383 F. Supp. 699, enforced, 383 F. Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 512 F.2d 37
(2d Cir. 1975).
52. Id. at 721.
53. 512 F.2d at 45. Remedial issues included the scope of the district court's equitable
remedial powers, whether magnet schools (schools intended to draw gifted students from
the entire district) are equivalent to freedom-of-choice (desegregation) plans which have
been held inadequate, and the extent to which busing would be permissible.
54. Id. at 49.
55. Id. (Emphasis added).
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did not clearly indicate a sharp distinction between northern and south-
ern discrimination or expressly restrict the "judicial methodology of
Wright, which used an objective test of foreseeable effect rather than
racial motive." 56 Ultimately the court found support for its foreseeabil-
ity test in the purpose of the fourteenth amendment, which is "not...
to assess blame but to prevent injustice. '57
Several of the Hart court's conclusions appear to be inaccurate. First,
the Second Circuit's conclusion that Keyes was solely concerned with
the effect an accepted finding of de jure segregation in a portion of a
district would have on the entire district ignores the emphasis the
Supreme Court placed on its statement regarding intent.5 8 Second, in
concluding that the Supreme Court decisions draw no sharp distinction
between northern and southern school desegregation cases, Hart
ignores the actual effect of Keyes, to require an element of proof in
northern cases which was unnecessary in southern cases. The precise
nature of that element of proof, however, has yet to be defined .59 Third,
56. Id.
57. Id. at 50. The court found further support for its standard by pointing out the near
impossibility and injustice to innocent parties of trying to ascertain the subjective motives
of a collective body. It concluded that the only reasonable test is the more orthodox,
objective reasonable man test which is used in the civil and criminal fields of law. The
court finally implied that its standard was in tune with recent northern school desegrega-
tion decisions in other circuits. Id. at 50-51. Closer analysis of the decisions, however,
reveals that they provide minimal support for the court's standard, especially when
compared with the diverse positions taken in other northern decisions. See Morgan v.
Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580,585-86(1st Cir. 1974) (failure of the state to remedy any segregated
condition as an important variable to consider); Oliver v. Michigan State Board of Educ.,
508 F.2d 178, 181 (6th Cir. 1974) (natural and foreseeable standard); Higgins v. Board of
Educ., 508 F.2d 779, 790-91,793 (6th Cir. 1974) (intent to segregate may be inferred from
severe racial imbalance but the school authorities have no responsibility to foresee
"segregation"); Berry v. School Dist. of Benton Harbor, 505 F.2d 238,243 (6th Cir. 1974)
(an effect test); Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 500 F.2d 349, 351-52 (9th
Cir. 1974) (motive is a relevant but not indispensable consideration). Compare United
States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 503 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1974) (permits presumption of
intent to be drawn from extreme racial imbalance), with Lawlor v. Board of Educ., 458
F.2d 660, 662 (7th Cir. 1972) (no affirmative duty to alleviate racial imbalance). See also
United States v. Board of Educ., Independent School Dist. No. 1,459 F.2d 720,724 (10th
Cir. 1972); Board of Educ., Independent Dist. No. 89 v. Dowell, 375 F.2d 158 (1 0th Cir.),
cert. denied, 387 U.S. 931 (1967); Downs v. Board of Educ., 336 F.2d 988,998 (10th Cir.
1964) (no affirmative duty to alleviate racially imbalanced situations).
58. 413 U.S. at 208. Throughout the opinion the Court consistently refused to address
the question of intent directly; yet if its standard is a valid basis for finding de jure
segregation, presumably it is a valid basis for establishing intent.
59. See note 42 supra. See also R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIc REPRESENTATION 473 (1968)
(draws an analogy between apportionment cases and education cases on this point,
concluding that there are two fourteenth amendments, a mild one for the North and a strict
one for the South).
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when the court used Wright to support its foreseeable effect standard,
the authoritative value was negligible, since Wright (which was a
southern case) concerned a standard used for judging desegregation
efforts after an initial determination of de jure segregation has been
made.6o
If Keyes requires proof of some form of mental culpability to show
intent, then the Hart standard at least satisfies that minimal require-
ment. State actions or omissions which have a foreseeable segregative
effect include an element of mental culpability. 6' The Hart standard is
inadequate, however, if Keyes requires proof of actual intent to
discriminate.
The solution to these questions may, to a large extent, turn upon the
purpose of the equal protection clause and the policy considerations
which provide the theoretical basis for the intent requirement.62 Green
and Wright cast doubt on the theory that the purpose of the equal
protection clause in the area of school segregation is to eliminate racial
motivation63 or, as the Second Circuit states, "assess blame." 64 If,
however, the purpose of the equal protection clause is to prevent unjust
treatment or to eliminate the segregated conditions which are the source
of the injustice, a strong case exists for expanding the intent standard.
This appears to be the rationale underlying the Second Circuit's decision
in Hart.
The Hart standard will make it easier for plaintiffs to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination. Plaintiffs will not have the harsh burden of
proving that a collective body was primarily motivated by a desire to
discriminate. Plaintiffs need only prove that the state's acts and omis-
60. See 407 U.S. 451 (1972). There may be a presumption of unconstitutionality once
segregative conditions are present in a system with a history of racial discrimination
violations. See note 19 supra. The presumption that requires proof of intent to segregate
(the presumption in favor of constitutionality of the state's act, see note 26 supra) is then
no longer operative.
61. The defendant would at least be guilty of negligence. There is, however, one
situation where even a mental culpability standard may not be met, and the defendant
would be held liable under Hart. The state may be forced to act in a manner that will result
in segregation because the alternatives are all found to be unreasonable. If a suspect
category or fundamental right were involved, however, this would present no problem, see
note 28 supra, since plaintiff would not have to prove intent. For a standard based solely
on the alternatives available see Karst, Emerging Nationwide StandardsforSchoolDeseg-
regation-Charlotte and Mobile, I BLACK L.J. 207, 220 (1971).
62. See notes 24 & 25 supra.
63. See notes 36-38 supra. In fact race must be a major consideration in any desegrega-
tion plan. See McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 41 (1971).
64. 512 F.2d at 50.
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sions were a foreseeable cause of the segregated school or school
district.65 This broader standard of proof may have its greatest impact on
the multi-district school desegregation cases which involve metropoli-
tan regions consisting of black urban cores and white suburban fringes.66
This growing demographic pattern has led many to believe that effective
school desegregation can be achieved only if both areas of the met-
ropolitan region are included in the remedial plans.67 Since the Supreme
Court's pronouncement that multi-district remedies must be based on a
multi-district violation,61 desegregation advocates have been searching
for a standard like that in Hart which will increase the chances of
proving such multi-district violations.
Stephen Stern
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717(1974); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413
U.S. 189 (1973); Bradley v. State Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 92 (1971).
67. As school districts become racially imbalanced when compared with neighboring
districts, the only solution to the problem of desegregation will be to find violations on an
interdistrict level. See Sedler, Metropolitan Desegregation in the Wake of Milliken-On
Losing Big Battles and Winning Small Wars: The View Largely from Within, 1975 WASH.
U.L.Q. 535; Note, Developing Litigation Strategies to Achieve Multidistrict Relief: The
Legal Implications of Milliken v. Bradley for Metropolitan School Desegregation, II
URBAN L. ANN. 187 (1975); cf. Rubinowitz & Dennis, SchoolDesegregation Versus Public
Housing Desegregation, supra note 7. The problem is not confined to the North, since new
municipalities formed after the Brown I decision have never had discriminatory statutes
on their books.
68. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). For a detailed history of the struggle for
equal educational opportunity see Bell, School Litigation Strategies for the 1970's: New
Phases in the Continuing Quest for Quality Schools, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 257.
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